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Forced Pregnancy and the ICC
Introduction  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the first tribunal to criminalize forced 
pregnancy.1 The Court’s statute defines forced pregnancy as “the unlawful confinement 
of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of 
any population or carrying out other violations of international law.”2 Although the 
concept of a forced pregnancy crime is relatively new,3 forced impregnation has been 
used throughout history as a tool of assimilation or subjugation of the enemy, minority, or 
slave populations.4 There is some evidence that the ancient Athenians used it as part of 
their genocide of the Melians for example,5 and in more recent times thousands of outcast 
children were born as a result of the rapes of Bengali women by the West Pakistani army 
in 1971.6
Nevertheless, it was not until the mass rapes in Bosnia and Rwanda caught the 
attention of feminist legal scholars7 that forced pregnancy began to capture the public 
 
1 Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and 
Consent, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625, 656 (2001).    
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7 (2)(f), Jul. 1, 2002, U.N. Doc A/Conf.183/9, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc [hereinafter ICC Statute].  
3 Boon, supra note 1, at 656. 
4 Roybn Charli Carpenter, Forced Maternity: Children’s Rights and the Genocide Convention, 2 J. 
GENOCIDE RES. 213, 223 (2000).    
5 Id. at 223 n.36. 
6 Id.
7 “Overnight, it seemed, that plight of Bosnian women had become a domestic issue to American 
feminists.”  R. Charli Carpenter, Surfacing Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape Discourse, 22 HUM.
2consciousness.8 Estimates vary but victims of rape gave birth to an estimated 2,000 - 
5,000 “children of hate” in Rwanda and perhaps 400 -600 in Bosnia.9 In Bosnia, 
particularly, commentators have alleged that Serbs had a systematic plan to impregnate 
Croatian and Muslim women and force them to bear Chetnik (i.e. Serb) babies.10 
Catherine MacKinnon railed against a legal system that made states lack of protection for 
women internationally protected.11 
Against this backdrop, feminist groups united to create the Women’s Caucus for 
Gender Justice in the ICC (“Women’s Caucus”).12 The Women’s Caucus was 
enormously influential during the planning phases of the ICC, and over the fierce 
opposition of some states, was successful in arguing for the inclusion of forced pregnancy 
in the ICC Statute.13 While the ICC has not yet tried its first case, the court has gone far 
beyond any other international tribunal in recognizing crimes committed against 
women.14 
Despite the optimism that surrounds the ICC and its recognition of forced  
 
RTS. Q. 428, 431 (2000); see also, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human 
Rights, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 5 (1994); BEVERLY ALLEN, RAPE WARFARE: THE HIDDEN GENOCIDE IN
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA (Univ. of Minnesota Press 1996); Siobhan Fisher, Occupation of the 
Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocide, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996).   
8 See generally Carpenter, supra note 4, at 223. 
9 Id.
10 Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical 
Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 348, 359 (1998); ALLEN, supra 
note 7, at 61-65.    
11 MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 12; see also Veronica C. Abreu, Women’s Bodies as Battlefields, 6 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L.1, 11 (2005) (“The current international legal framework inadequately addresses the realities 
of . . . sexual terrorism.”).    
12 See Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the Rome Statute 
for the International Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 352 (2002); see also Marlies Glasius, How 
Activists Shaped the Court, Crimes of War Project (Dec. 2003), at 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/icc_magazine/icc-glasius.html.   
13 See Glasius, supra note 12; see also Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 12, at 352; Alessandra Stanley, Semantics 
Stalls Pact Labeling Rape a War Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at A3.
14 See, e.g., Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 12, at 353; Boon, supra note 1, at 673; see also Tina Karkera, The 
International Criminal Court’s Protection of Women: The Hands of Justice at Work, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 198 (2004).    
3pregnancy, little attention has been paid to how the crime will be prosecuted.  In this 
article, I will examine the potential difficulties associated with prosecuting forced 
pregnancy.  In Part I, I examine the ambiguities in the definition of forced pregnancy as 
well as the mens rea and act reus of the crime.  A particular problem is that ICC 
definition “shall not in anyway be interpreted as affecting national laws related to 
pregnancy.”15 Is it possible to make sense of “forced pregnancy” without in some sense 
recognizing a women’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy?  In Part II, I will 
address the different contexts in which forced pregnancy can potentially be prosecuted.  
Forced pregnancy qualifies as both a crime against humanity and a war crime under the 
ICC statute.16 There are particular challenges to prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime 
against humanity and war crime.  I will also address the claim that the ICC Statute does 
not go far enough - that forced pregnancy is genocide.   
 
Part I:   What Is Forced Pregnancy? 
 
A. The Elements of Forced Pregnancy  
 To prove the crime of forced pregnancy, the prosecutor will have to establish that 
“[t]he perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of 
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations 
 
15 ICC Statute, supra note 2, 7(2)(f).   
16 ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii).   
4of international law.” 17 This holds true whether the perpetrator is tried for forced 
pregnancy as a war crime or crime against humanity.18 
As the above definition makes clear, the act reus of the crime of forced pregnancy 
is not the rape and impregnation19 but rather the unlawful confinement.20 The perpetrator 
of forced pregnancy is the person who confined “one or more women forcibly made 
pregnant”21 not the one who necessarily committed the rape.22 As Kristen Boon notes, 
“The legal harm of forced pregnancy is that women are kept pregnant by means of 
confinement.”23 The confinement must also be “to a certain location”24 and the crucial 
period is between the time a woman is thought to be pregnant and the termination of the 
pregnancy.25 To be sure, the prosecutor will have to prove that the woman confined was 
also “forcibly made pregnant” but in theory a woman could be forcibly made pregnant 
through artificial insemination or other modern technology.26 Preventing a woman from 
 
17 Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Ct., U.N. Doc.  
PCNICC/2001/1/Add.1, art. 7(i)(g)(4) & art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-4 (2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/rules/english/1_add1e.pdf [hereinafter Elements]. 
18 See id.
19 See Boon, supra note 1, at 660.    
20 See ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(2)(f) (“Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a 
woman forcibly made pregnant.”). 
21 Elements, supra note 17, arts. 7(I)(g)(4)(1), 8(2)(b)(xxii)(1). 
22 Some commentators seem confused on this point.  See e.g., Jonathan M.H. Short, Sexual Violence as 
Genocide: The Developing Law of the International Criminal Tribunals and the International Criminal 
Court, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 503, 512 (“Forced pregnancy is accomplished by impregnating a woman, 
whether by rape or other medical means, with the sperm of a man of a different ethnicity.”); see also 
Carpenter, supra note 7, at 445-49 (2000) (discussing failure of MacKinnon and others to differentiate 
forced impregnation from forced pregnancy).     
23 Boon, supra note 1, at 660.   
24 Elements, supra note 17, art. 8(2)(a)(vii)(2)(1).   
25 Boon, supra note 1, at 662-63.  
26 Anne Tierney Goldstein, Recognizing Forced Impregnation as a War Crime Under International Law: A 
Special Report of the International Program, Ctr. for Reproductive Law & Policy, p. 91 (1993); see also 
Carmela Buehler, The Crime of Forced Pregnancy in the Nascent System of Supranational Criminal Law,
NEMESIS, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 158, 166.   
5using contraceptives could be sufficient action to make a woman forcibly pregnant under 
the Statute.27 
The ICC Statute stipulates that the confinement must be “with the intent of 
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations 
of international law.”28 To prove forced pregnancy, therefore, it is not sufficient for the 
prosecutor to show that a woman forcibly made pregnant has been confined.  The 
Croatian government would not be liable for forced pregnancy, for example, if it 
prevented a Croat raped and impregnated by Serbs from securing an abortion because the 
government presumably lacked the requisite mens rea. As a practical matter, the intent 
requirement places a limit on the identity of the perpetrators and victims - they must be 
members or thought to be members of different ethnic groups.29 
Forced pregnancy can also be prosecuted when the confinement was committed 
with the intent to perpetrate other grave violations of international law.30 This alternate 
intent requirement broadens the scope of forced pregnancy considerably because there is 
no limit on the ethnicity of perpetrators or victims.31 Unfortunately, the ICC statute does 
not explain what it is meant by “grave violations.”32 Presumably the conduct covered 
would include confining a forcibly impregnated woman for the purpose of conducting 
 
27 Boon, supra note 1, at 661. 
28 ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(2)f, 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
29 Boon, supra note 1, at 663.   
30 ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(2)f, 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
31 Boon, supra note 1, at 665. 
32 The Statute does refer to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. See ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8 
(2)(a). There is some evidence that sexual crimes would constitute grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions although this is not explicit in Article 8(2). See Jocelyn Campanaro, Women, War, and 
International Law: The Historical Treatment of Gender-Based War Crimes, 89 GEO. L.J. 2557, 2589 
(2001).    
6scientific experiments as the Nazis did during World War II33 or in order to enslave the 
mother and/or child.34 Courts will likely have a great deal of discretion to shape the mens 
rea required for forced pregnancy because the ICC Statute does not impose any definite 
limitations.   
 
B. Conceptual Problems in the Definition of Forced Pregnancy 
The definition of forced pregnancy could be more precise in several respects.  
Although it is relatively clear that the act reus is the unlawful confinement, it is not as 
clear whether a woman must be forcibly made pregnant with the intent of “affecting the 
ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of 
international law.”35 A textual reading suggests that only the confinement is subject to the 
heightened requirement because a comma separates “forcibly made pregnant” from “with 
the intent of . . .”  Thus, the prosecutor will not have to explore the reasons underlying a 
rape, for example.36 Nevertheless, the ICC Statute could be clearer on this point.  
Another important question is what the prosecutor has to prove with regards the 
pregnancy itself.  Presumably he/she will have to present evidence that the pregnancy 
was not voluntary and was brought about by rape, for example.   The person accused of 
forced pregnancy could, if he chose, produce evidence to show that this was not the case - 
even if he was not the one who impregnated the victim.  To prove forced pregnancy, 
therefore, it will often be necessary to prove rape by a party not before the court.  Given 
 
33 See Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the 
International Criminal Court, BROWN JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, Vol. VI, Iss. 1, 1999, at 65, 74.   
34 See ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(c).  Enslavement encompasses trafficking under the Statute.  Id.
35 Id., art. 7(2)(f).   
36 Proving political motives in rape cases is notoriously difficult as anyone with experience in asylum law 
can attest to.  See generally Krishna R. Patel, Recognizing the Rape of Bosnian Women as Gender-Based 
Prosecution, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 929 (1994).  
7this, how much evidence will the prosecution have to present on this point? Will the 
judges have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a rape occurred to convict the 
perpetrator of forced pregnancy?37 Perhaps the ICC will have to try the rape first and then 
move on to the forced pregnancy charge.  If the rape can be treated as a mere part of the 
forced pregnancy proceeding, however, the alleged rapist’s right to be tried in his 
presence would appear to be violated.38 He would be denied the opportunity to contest 
the claims made against him or put forward the defense of his choosing.39 There may 
also be implications for the presumption of innocence.40 Yet, surely every time someone 
is accused of forced pregnancy, the prosecution cannot be expected to hold a rape trial as 
well.  Perhaps the ICC framers assumed that the person who forcibly impregnated the 
victim would also be the one on trial for forced pregnancy although, as I have suggested, 
this may not be the case.41 
The ICC’s forced pregnancy provision also does not specify whether the alleged 
perpetrator must know that the woman he is confining was forcibly made pregnant.  Is it 
enough that he should have known?  As a general matter under the ICC statute, a 
wrongdoer must have knowledge of all the material elements of a crime42 where 
knowledge is defined as “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will 
occur in the ordinary course of events.”43 Presumably this means that the perpetrator of 
forced pregnancy must be aware that the woman he is confining is pregnant and also that 
the impregnation was forcible, whether it occurred through rape or some other means. 
 
37 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 66(3). 
38 Id. art. 63(1).  
39 See generally id. art. 67.   
40 Id. art. 66(1).   
41 See also Carmela Buehler, supra note 26, at 166.   
42 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 30.   
43 Id. art. 30(3) 
8Considering that he may well not have been present during the rape, the perpetrator might 
argue that he could not know the circumstances of the pregnancy.  This argument is more 
convincing then it appears at first glance. The court, after all, has to make its own 
determination on whether a woman was forcibly made pregnant, and this determination 
involves a mixture of fact and law.  The court will presumably consider legal concepts 
such as “force” and “consent.”44 Wouldn’t a suspect have to have made a similar 
determination to “know” that the woman was forcibly made pregnant? The ICC views 
knowledge as actual awareness and in forced pregnancy cases, prosecutors might be 
hard-pressed to demonstrate sufficient awareness.    
 
C. Relation to National Abortion Laws 
Perhaps the most puzzling part of the ICC’s treatment of forced pregnancy is that 
the definition “shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to 
pregnancy.”45 This language was added to Article 7.2(f) on the insistence of the Vatican 
and states opposed to abortion.46 These delegations to the preparatory conference were 
concerned that forced pregnancy would be used to supplant anti-abortion laws and 
endanger Catholic hospitals that refused to provide abortions.47 This language ensures 
that the ICC will not recognize a general right to abortion.   
If there is no right to obtain an abortion, then how to make sense of the forced 
pregnancy provision in the ICC statute?  Rape and unlawful confinement are already 
 
44 Buehler, supra note 26, at 167.  The ICTY’s use of such concepts has not been without controversy.  See 
generally Adrienne Kalosieh, Consent to Genocide? The ICTY’s Improper Use of the Consent Paradigm to 
Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foca, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 121 (2003).   
45 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7.2(f). 
46 See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
22, 31 (1999); see also Boon, supra note 1, at 659; Buehler, supra note 26, at 165.   
47 Boon, supra note 1, at 659.   
9prohibited under the ICC statute.48 Boon argues that that criminalization of forced 
pregnancy evidences respect for a woman’s bodily integrity and sexual autonomy,49 but 
her argument could just as easily apply in the domestic context to oppose all regulation of 
abortion, and yet, the forced pregnancy provision “shall not in any way be interpreted as 
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”50 More convincingly, Carmela Buehler 
argues that an unwanted pregnancy greatly exacerbates the pain of the rape.51 She writes, 
“If she is forced to bear the child as a consequence of her confinement, this is a long 
process during which the child will always be a reminder of her ordeal.”52 Others have 
speculated that “[p]regnancy may worsen the long-term of impact of rape on the victim 
by eliminating any chance of maintaining acceptance by a husband or family.”53 Perhaps 
the best way to understand forced pregnancy under the ICC Statute is that women should 
be able to terminate “forced” pregnancies54 whereas it is up to individual nation-states to 
determine if abortion should be available in other situations.   
 There are two problems with this analysis.  As previously noted, a woman can be 
made forcibly pregnant without necessarily having been raped.  It seems inadequate to 
justify the crime of forced pregnancy, therefore, on the assumption that the crime occurs 
pursuant to a rape.  Indeed, if Boon is correct, a woman can be forcibly made pregnant 
when she is denied access birth control. 55 If this is indeed the case, I find it hard to 
 
48 Rape is prohibited as both a crime against humanity and a war crime.  See ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 
7(1)(g), 8(b)(xxii).  Unlawful confinement is a war crime.  Id. art. 8(2)(vi).   
49 Boon, supra note 1, at 668.   
50 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7.2(f).  
51 Buehler, supra note 26, at 172.   
52 Id.
53 See Carpenter, supra note 7, at 435.   
54 Boon states that this right may already be guaranteed under Article 12 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, but this is a controversial position.  See Boon, 
supra note 1, at 666. 
55 Boon, supra note 1, at 661; see also Buehler, supra note 26, at 8.   
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believe that the reason this woman should be allowed to terminate her pregnancy is 
because the pregnancy would represent an ongoing reminder of the harm done to her in 
denying her access to contraception.  The indignity central to the crime of forced 
pregnancy is not being forcibly made pregnant - which will usually be punishable as rape 
or some other crime56 - but rather that a woman is being forced to carry a child against 
her will.  If it were otherwise, the Statute would criminalize “forced impregnation” not 
“forced pregnancy.”     
 Second, and perhaps more important, if the ICC Statute recognized a woman’s 
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy that was caused by rape, for example, then 
the Statute would not have noted that forced pregnancy “shall not in any way be 
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.”57 There is no guarantee that 
national abortion laws will not infringe on a woman’s right to terminate a forced 
pregnancy.  This is hardly surprising as the provision needed to satisfy constituents that 
were fervently opposed to abortion.58 Boon argues that most national abortion laws 
already recognize an exception for forced pregnancies.59 Even if this is so, however, the 
ICC Statute seems to concede that nations have the right to set their own abortion laws, 
and this would presumably trump any obligations nations had under earlier treaties or 
customary international law.60 
The consequence of the forced pregnancy compromise is that the ICC appears to 
have created a state action exception in forced pregnancy cases.  If nations are allowed to 
 
56 Impregnating someone against their will via artificial insemination, for example, presumably falls under 
the Statute’s prohibition on using medical science against the interests of the patient.  See ICC Statute, 
supra note 2, art. 8(b)(xi).   
57 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7.2(f). 
58 See Arsanjani, supra note 46, at 31; see also Buehler, supra note 26, at 165; Boon, supra note 1, at 659.   
59 See Boon, supra note 1, at 666.   
60 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.   
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restrict abortion however they wish, then they can presumably confine women in order to 
prevent them from having abortions.  A person confining a woman forcibly made 
pregnant pursuant to a national law that prohibited abortion, therefore, would be immune 
from prosecution by the ICC.  If a private individual were to affect the confinement, 
however, he too might be immune from prosecution depending on whether his conduct 
would be sanctioned by the state.61 The ICC Statute never explains exactly what 
constitutes “unlawful confinement” in the forced pregnancy context, and given this, the 
ICC seems obliged to consider whether suspects have violated their own nation’s 
abortion laws.    
This apparent deference given to national law in forced pregnancy prosecutions is 
in stark contrast to how other crimes are prosecuted by the ICC.  As a general matter, the 
ICC will only apply domestic law as a last resort, after having examined the ICC Statute 
and international materials.62 A worrying possibility is that the ICC might have to apply 
national abortion laws even when they are fundamentally discriminatory or sexist.   
While applying such laws is forbidden by Article 21 (3) of the ICC Statute, the fact that 
forced pregnancy “shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating 
to pregnancy” 63 suggests that the ICC Statute requires that enormous deference be given 
to national abortion laws.  As a practical matter, it will be difficult - if not impossible - to 
charge a person who lives in a society that does not permit abortion with the crime of 
forced pregnancy under the ICC Statute.  Citizens who live in states where abortion is 
permitted would of course be subject to the ICC’s jurisprudence.  This disparity can be 
 
61 That is, if it permitted the confinement of abortion-seeking woman by her family, for example, and not 
only the government.   
62 See ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 21(1). 
63 Id. art. 7(2)(f) (emphasis added).   
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explained by the fact that the core of forced pregnancy is that women cannot be 
prevented from terminating unwanted pregnancies, and nations who reject abortion 
appear to have been successful in carving out an exception for themselves in the Statute. 
 
Part II: The Manifestations of Forced Pregnancy 
 
The ICC Statute recognizes forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity as well 
as a war crime.64 Many commentators have also argued that forced pregnancy is 
genocide65 although the ICC does not explicitly treat it as such.  Forced pregnancy is 
defined identically in Article 7 (the ICC’s crimes against humanity provision) and Article 
8 (the ICC’s war crimes provision), but the elements of forced pregnancy differ 
depending on the context.  There are particular challenges depending on whether forced 
pregnancy is prosecuted as a crime against humanity, war crime, or genocide.     
 
A. Forced Pregnancy as a Crime Against Humanity  
 To be convicted of the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy, the 
perpetrator’s conduct must meet the definition of forced pregnancy in Article 7(2)(f) as 
outlined above.  In addition, the crime must be part of a “widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population”66 and the perpetrator must know that his conduct 
was part of or intended to be part of this widespread or systematic attack.67 
64 See ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(i)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
65 See e.g., ALLEN, supra note 7, at 91; MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 11.   
66 Elements, supra note 17, art. 7 (I)(g)(4)(2). 
67 See id. art. 7(I)(g)(4)(3).     
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The ICC Statute defines “attack directed against a civilian population” as a 
“course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts [such as murder] against 
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack.”68 Forced pregnancy then must occur against a backdrop of violence 
where murder, rape, and other enumerated crimes69 are prevalent.   Although there need 
not be a full-blown war,70 the attack must be “widespread or systematic” but not 
necessarily systematic and widespread.71 This is the case for all crimes against 
humanity.72 
While the ICC Statute does not define either “widespread” or “systematic,” the 
former requirement seems to suggest that an attack must of a relatively large scale while 
systematic refers to the element of coordinated planning.73 To prosecute forced 
pregnancy as a crime against humanity, therefore, not only must there be the crime occur 
as part of an attack, but the attack must be of a large scale or alternatively involve a high 
degree of coordination (and the perpetrator must know of the attack and his role in it).  
There also appears to be a limit on the identity of the perpetrator because the attack of 
which he is a part must be “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy.”74 This would rule out “free-lancers” who decide to commit crimes on their 
own.75 
Prosecuting forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity is problematic in a 
number of respects.  The act reus of forced pregnancy is unlawful confinement and 
 
68 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a). 
69 Id. arts. 7(1)(a)-(k).  Forced pregnancy is one of the qualifying crimes listed under 7(1)(g).   
70 See Buehler, supra note 26, at 168. 
71 See id.
72 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1).  
73 David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 108 (2004). 
74 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a). 
75 Luban, supra note 73, at 96.   
14
presumably the confinement could occur away from any widespread or systematic attack 
- forced pregnancy is a crime that often occurs in isolation.76 It is conceivable that in 
many cases the confiner would be unaware of the circumstances of the systematic or 
widespread attack.  How can forced pregnancy truly be part of an attack, moreover, when 
the unlawful confinement will often occur far away from the original attack?77 While 
crimes like murder are often part of attacks on civilian populations, forced pregnancy is 
ultimately a crime committed against an individual woman.  This has led some to suggest 
that the attack requirement must be loosened for sex-related crimes against humanity like 
forced pregnancy.78 
The ICC Statute also does not address the issue of whether the prosecution would 
have to prove that there was a national policy to commit force pregnancies.  Without such 
a policy, the perpetrator might not be acting “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy.”79 The Statute states that it is the attack itself that must be 
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy” whereas the forced 
pregnancy merely needs to be a part of the attack.80 But how can forced pregnancy be 
part of this attack unless there is at least implicit state approval of the crime?  If history is 
any guide, prosecutors might be hard-pressed to find the requisite evidence of state 
 
76 Cf. Brook Sari Moshan, Women War, and Words: The Gender Component in the Permanent 
International Criminal Court’s Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 154, 183 
(1998) (arguing that rape and other sex-related crimes occur in isolation and thus might not constitute 
crimes against humanity under the Statute).   
77 What if the unlawful confinement was to occur in Serbia, for example, but the forced impregnation and 
rape occurred in Bosnia? 
78 See Moshan, supra note 76, at 183.  
79 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a). 
80 Compare Elements, supra note 17, 8(2)(e)(vi)(4)(3 with ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(I)(g)(4)(3). 
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sanction.81 It will be interesting to see in which instances the ICC will prosecute forced 
pregnancy as a crime against humanity.     
 
B. Forced Pregnancy as War Crime 
 The ICC Statute allows forced pregnancy to be prosecuted as a war crime if the 
crime occurs in the context of (or is associated with) either an international conflict82 or a 
non-international conflict.83 Forced pregnancy is one of the war crimes in Article 8 that 
are “serious violations of the laws and customs”84 of international law but not “grave 
breaches” of the Geneva Conventions.85 This does not necessarily mean that the ICC 
views forced pregnancy as any less serious than other war crimes, but rather, under the 
Geneva Conventions (which form the basis of modern prosecution of war crimes), rape 
and other sex crimes are not acknowledged as “grave breaches.”86 The perpetrator of 
forced pregnancy must be aware of the factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict whether the conflict is international or internal.87 
Armed conflict is not precisely defined under the ICC Statute.  However, the 
Statue makes clear that “armed conflicts” are not “situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar 
 
81 In Bosnia, there were documented incidents of forced pregnancy, but these incidents were not tied to any 
official Serbian policy of impregnating women and preventing them from terminating their pregnancies. 
See Final Report of The Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 
(1992), U.N. SCOR, para. 248, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).  The Final Report also states, “[A] 
systematic rape policy existed in certain areas, but it remains to be proven whether such an overall policy 
existed which was to apply to all non-Serbs.” Id. This does not mean that there was no policy but does 
suggest that actual evidence of such policies is not always readily available.  
82 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8.2(b)(xxii). 
83 Id. art. 8.2(e)(vi). 
84 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(b).   
85 Id. art. (2)(a). 
86 See Buehler, supra note 26, at 169.  
87 Elements, supra note 17, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)(4), 8(2)(e)(vi)(4).   
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nature.”88 War crimes occur only where there is a protracted armed conflict between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.89 From 
this, it seems evident that the ICC is precluded from prosecuting war crimes when there 
are not two hostile parties.  If a government were to launch an attack on a population that 
had not taken up arms, its agents could probably not be charged with war crimes 
(although they could certainly be tried for crimes against humanity).  This is regrettable 
from the perspective of justice, but the ICC only has jurisdiction over persons “for the 
most serious crimes of international concern” (emphasis added).90 Presumably domestic 
courts could prosecute war crimes such as forced pregnancy that do not occur in the 
context of international conflicts or serious internal conflicts.   
 The elements of forced pregnancy as a war crime are more lax than those of 
forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity.  The perpetrator need only be aware that 
an armed conflict exists - he need not know that there is a “widespread or systematic” 
attack or his particular role in the attack.91 The armed conflict and the crimes committed 
therein need not be “in furtherance of a state or organizational policy.”92 Moreover, the 
forced pregnancy does not have to be committed as a part of the armed conflict93 - it 
merely has to be associated with it.94 As long as an armed conflict involves the large-
scale or purposeful commission of war crimes,95 and the perpetrator of forced pregnancy 
had some connection to the conflict, he can be convicted for committing a war crime.   
 
88 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(f).   
89 Id.
90 Id. art. 1.  
91 Compare Elements, supra note 17, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)(4)(3), with Elements, supra note 17, art. 7(I)(g)(4)(3).  
92 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a). 
93 See Elements, supra note 17, art.7(I)(g)(4)(2). 
94 See id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)(4), 8(2)(e)(vi)(4)(3). 
95 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(1). 
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 The ICC’s treatment of forced pregnancy as a war crime would seem to still 
preclude prosecuting free-lancers.  This is potentially troublesome.  If someone takes 
advantage of the existence of an armed conflict, where law and order has broken down, 
he should not be able to escape punishment simply because his conduct was not strictly 
“associated” with the armed conflict.  However, given prior jurisprudence before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Court is likely to 
interpret the “armed conflict” requirement quite liberally.  In Tadic, for example, the 
ICTY wrote that there is a nexus between conduct and an armed conflict if an act is not 
unrelated to the armed conflict and was not done for the perpetrator’s purely personal 
motives.96 Under this precedent, the ICC will likely be able to reach even perpetrators 
whose actions were tangentially connected to armed conflicts.  Most prosecutions of 
forced pregnancy will likely be under the ICC’s war crimes provision.   
 
C. Forced Pregnancy as Genocide 
 The ICC Statute does not explicitly treat forced pregnancy as genocide.  The 
Statute lists five acts that constitute genocide when committed with the intent to “destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” and forced pregnancy 
is not one of these acts.97 This seems to stand to reason.  As one commentator has put it, 
“How is it possible to view the creation of human life as genocidal? How precisely is a 
group destroyed by the creation of individuals?”98 Moreover, the notion that forced 
pregnancy is genocide forces us to ignore several biological realities.99 When a woman is 
 
96 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.IT-94-1-I, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 634 (May 7, 1997).   
97 See ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 6. 
98 Carpenter, supra note 4, at 218, 222.  
99 See generally Salzman, supra note 10, at 364-65. 
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forcibly made pregnant with the intent of the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of 
a group,100 the ethnic composition of the group is not really affected because the child 
will still in part belong to the mother’s group.  Children, after all, receive equal parts 
genetic material from mother and father.  
To some advocates, however, genocide can be equated with the pollution of the 
bloodline.101 Catherine MacKinnon has claimed: “Croatian and Muslim women are 
being raped, and then denied abortions, to help make a Serbian state by making Serbian 
babies.”102 MacKinnon’s argument is that in patriarchal societies like Serbia, where the 
ethnic identity is based on the ethnicity of the father, forced pregnancy is used to increase 
the population of one group at the expense of the other.103 Siobhan Fisher has put the 
point more generally: “When reproduction is used to proliferate members of one group 
and simultaneously to prevent the reproduction of members of another, it is a form of 
destruction.”104 As long as the victim of forced pregnancy is carrying the child of the 
enemy, she cannot give birth to children of her own group, and after she gives birth she 
may be too devastated to bear children of her group in the future.105 What is important 
then might not be the genetic reality that the children of forced pregnancy belong to both 
groups, but rather the perceptions of perpetrators and victims.106 
This view has some support in the Akayesu decision before the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).107 In dicta, the Tribunal wrote that forced 
 
100 ICC Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(2)f, 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
101 See Darren Anne Nebesar, Note, Gender-Based Violence as a Weapon of War, 4.U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. 
& POL’Y 148, 154 (2000). 
102 MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 11.   
103 See id; see also Salzman, supra note 10, at 365.   
104 Fisher, supra note 7, at 121.   
105 See Buehler, supra note 26, at 171.   
106 Salzman, supra note 10, at 365. 
107 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sep. 2, 1998). 
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pregnancy can be seen as genocide when it is intended to prevent births within a group.108 
The ICTR wrote: “In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined 
by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a 
group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately 
impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child 
who will consequently not belong to its mother's group.”109 Like the ICTR, the ICC 
recognizes that that the imposition of measures intended to prevent births is genocide.110 
Forced pregnancy then, if performed with the requisite intent, could potentially be 
prosecuted as genocide under Article 6(d) of the Statute.111 
Although the ICC may choose to read Article 6(d) to allow for the prosecution of 
forced pregnancy as genocide, there are strong reasons that it should not do so.  The 
perpetrator of forced pregnancy is able to affect the ethnic composition of a particular 
group only if the group views the offspring as a product of “the other.”  Carpenter writes, 
“To function as genocide, the children (and the mothers who bore children “of the 
enemy”) must be seen by the group as alien to the group.”112 To treat forced pregnancy 
as genocide is to substantiate the myth that identity is determined solely by the ethnicity 
of the father; it is to accept the notion that the mother’s ethnicity is erased from the 
offspring.113 Such views have real-world consequences, most notably on the “children of 
 
108 Id. ¶ 507. 
109 Id.
110 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(d).   
111 Buehler also speculates that forced pregnancy can be prosecuted as genocide under Article 6(b) – where 
the qualifying action is causing serious bodily or mental harm. See generally Buehler, supra note 26, at 
170-71.  While Buehler is undoubtedly correct that forced pregnancy causes bodily or mental harm, forced 
pregnancy is only the destruction of a group in so far as it is seen by the group as such. See discussion 
infra.
112 Carpenter, supra note 7, at 444. 
113 See id. at 443. 
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the enemy,” who inevitably end up alienated from both cultures.114 The overall treatment 
of such children is of deep stigma,115 and the women who give birth to them are often 
isolated from their own culture and community.116 The preamble of the ICC Statute 
proclaims that the state parties are “conscious that all peoples are united by common 
bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage.”  Treating forced pregnancy as 
genocide is to validate the notion that a child must be ethnically and culturally pure to 
belong to a particular people.     
 The intent required to commit genocide also appears to be at odds with the intent 
required for forced pregnancy.  To commit genocide, one must have the intent to 
“destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”117 To 
commit forced pregnancy, however, the perpetrator must have the intention to affect the 
ethnic composition of a population or carry out other violations of international law by 
means of unlawful confinement.118 The intent required for forced pregnancy is usually 
readily inferred from the facts of the confinement.  When a pregnant woman is held until 
she gives birth to a “child of the enemy” and then let go, this would seem to suggest that 
the confinement was for the purpose of affecting the ethnic composition of her group.  
The same facts cannot also give rise to genocide unless having the intent to affect the 
ethnic composition of a group also means the perpetrator has the intent to “destroy in 
whole or in part.”  Such an interpretation, however, would turn every war crime and 
crime against humanity of forced pregnancy into genocide.  Apart from the fact that it is 
 
114 See generally Carpenter, supra note 4, at 228-32.   
115 Id. at 228.  Carpenter goes on to write with regards the children born in Bosnia: “The children who were 
born were nearly always rejected by their mothers and communities, killed, abandoned, or cared for by 
orphanages and in some cases denied citizenship.” Id..
116 See Buehler, supra note 26, at 170; see also Nebesar, supra note 101, at 155 (“The woman’s scar is not 
just her own, yet she alone is shunned for having it.”). 
117 ICC Statute, supra note 2, art. 6(a).   
118 See id. arts. 7(2)f, 8(2)(b)(xxii). 
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bizarre to think of a confinement of a person (pregnant or not) being committed with 
genocidal intent, the framers of the ICC could not have intended such a result.   
Moreover, if one group wished to destroy another, forced pregnancy would 
probably not be the weapon of choice.  According to one account from a rape camp, 
women who were to bear “Chetnik babies” were segregated from the rest, received extra 
food and other privileges, and were examined by gynecologists.119 Forced pregnancy is 
a horrible crime, but it is hard to read these facts as proof of genocide.  Presumably a 
group intent on genocide would not confine women of the enemy group and let them go –
they would kill them.  MacKinnon has speculated that the idea of forced pregnancy is to 
create a “fifth column” in the enemy population, but the children of forced pregnancy can 
assimilate and are just as likely to be victims of murder and genocide as anyone else.120 
As Carpenter has argued, “It seems conceptually meaningless to rely on the imagination 
of perpetrators to label a child’s ethnicity when in fact the child’s experience and identity 
may be embedded in a different community.”121 While the ICC is not precluded from 
treating forced pregnancy as genocide, there are legal and practical considerations that 
justify the ICC’s Statute’s position in not explicitly treating it as such.  The ICC should 
focus on prosecuting forced pregnancy as a war crime and crime against humanity.  
 
119 Salzman, supra note 10, at 359.  
120 Carpenter, supra note 4, at 232.   
121 Id.
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Conclusion 
International courts are increasingly concerned with crimes committed against 
women such as forced pregnancy and forced marriage.122 At the same time, the ICC and 
other institutions123 have yet to try these crimes.  Although it is a welcome development 
that the rights of women are no longer of secondary concern to international law, we 
cannot be sure how courts will treat these crimes.  The ICC will have substantial 
discretion in analyzing forced pregnancy because the work of the ad hoc tribunals and 
domestic jurisprudence is of limited use in dealing with a crime that has only recently 
been recognized.  
In this article, I have attempted to demonstrate some of the potential flaws in the 
ICC’s treatment of forced pregnancy.  In Part I, I focused on ambiguities in the definition, 
particularly with regards the act reus and mens rea of the crime.  Forced pregnancy is not 
actually one crime - but two: There must both be a forcible impregnation and an unlawful 
confinement.  The perpetrator of forced pregnancy is the one who commits the latter 
crime.  However, since one cannot be convicted of forced pregnancy without the 
impregnation occurring, the prosecution will also have to prove that the former crime 
occurred.  This is potentially problematic since the rights of third-parties may be 
implicated in the proceeding, and it is unclear how much knowledge the perpetrator of 
forced pregnancy must have as to the origins of the pregnancy.  We also have every 
reason to question whether the Statute’s deference to national abortion laws is appropriate 
 
122 For a discussion of “forced marriage” before the Special Court of Sierra Leone, see generally Bianaifer 
Nowrojee, Making the Invisible War Crime Visible: Post-Conflict Justice for Sierra Leone’s Rape Victims,
18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85, 100-02 (2005).  Forced marriages qualify as “other inhumane acts” under the 
Crimes Against Humanity Provisions of the Special Court’s Statute.  See id. at 102. 
123 Defendants have been charged with “forced marriage” by the Special Court for Sierra Leone but no 
judgments have yet been made.  See generally Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor 
Welcomes Arraignment of RUF and AFRC Indictees on Charges Related to Forced Marriage (May 17, 
2004), available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/prosecutor-051704.html. 
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given that the criminalization of forced pregnancy is supposed to protect a woman’s right 
to not be pregnant against her will. 
In Part II of this paper, I turned to the special difficulties posed in prosecuting 
forced pregnancy as a crime against humanity and war crime.  Given the special nature of 
forced pregnancy, it will be hard to prove that the crime was committed as part of a 
“widespread or systematic” attack.  The perpetrator who confines the victim may have a 
credible argument that he is unaware of the particulars of any attack, let alone that his 
action was pursuant to any organizational policy.  Indeed, treating forced pregnancy as a 
crime against humanity moves the inquiry away from the harm done to an individual 
woman to an inquiry into an individual’s complicity in a larger unlawful scheme.  
Prosecuting forced pregnancy as a war crime is not as problematic since the perpetrator 
need not be furthering some governmental policy - his conduct simply needs to be loosely 
associated with an armed conflict.  We can expect to see most prosecutions of forced 
pregnancy to be under the war crimes provisions of the ICC Statute.   
Lastly, I argued that while forced pregnancy can potentially be read as genocide 
under Article 6(d) of the ICC Statute (i.e. as a measure intended to prevent births in 
another group), the ICC should be reluctant to treat forced pregnancy as genocide.   
Forced pregnancy contributes to the destruction of a group only to the extent that we 
accept the notion that children must belong to one group or another.  While forced 
pregnancy is a horrible crime, the action of detaining a woman so she can be forced to 
give birth does not rise to the level of genocide, and courts will be unlikely to infer 
genocidal intent from the facts of a forced pregnancy.  Forced pregnancy inflicts very real 
pain on individual women, but it has little to do with the destruction of a group.      
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In criminalizing forced pregnancy, the ICC is sending a clear message to the 
world that women cannot be treated as mere “vessel[s] of reproduction.”124 At the same 
time, many challenges await the court as it begins to prosecute forced pregnancy.  The 
ICC must strike a balance between vindicating victims and respecting the rights of 
suspects accused of this new crime.   
 
124 See Carpenter, supra note 7, at 443.   
